In practical quantum key distribution, weak coherent state is often used and the channel transmittance can be very small therefore the protocol could be totally insecure under the photon-number-splitting attack. We propose an efficient method to verify the upper bound of the fraction of tagged pulses (multi-photon counting rate) given whatever type of Eve's action. Our verified upper bound is equal to the real value in the asymptotic case. In typically practical set-ups, our method can also verify a tight upper bound which is only a few percent larger than the real value, with a probability exponentially close to 0 that the verified bound is violated.
randomly dephasing, the state is actually a mixed state of
2π 0 |µe iθ µe iθ |dθ = n P n (µ)|n n| (1) and P n (µ) = µ n e −µ n! . Here µ is a non-negative number. In practice, especially in doing longdistance QKD, the channel transmittance η can be rather small. Especially, if it is less than 1 − e −µ − µe −µ , Eavesdropper (Eve) in principle can have the full information of Bob's sifted key by the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [10] : Eve blocks all single-photon pulses and part of multi-photon pulses and separates each of the remained multi-photon pulses into two parts therefore each part contains at least one photon. She keeps one part and sends the other part to Bob, through a lossless channel.
If the channel is not so lossy, Alice and Bob can still set-up the unconditionally secure final key with a key rate [11] 
if we use a random classical CSS code [5] to distill the final key [11] . Here t is the detected flipping error rate, ∆ is the fraction of tagged signals [11] , i.e. the fraction for those counts immediately after Alice sends out a multi-photon pulse. The functional H(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x). From the above formula we see that a tight bound for ∆ is rather important in both key rate and the threshold of flipping rates. Given the worst case that all multi-photon pulses cause clicks of Bob ′ detector, long-distance QKD in free space or optical fiber is almost impossible by using weak coherent states. So far, the only possible economic method for global secure communications with QKD is the method using light reflection through a satellite [12] . In such a case, the channel transmittance could be much less than 1 − e −µ − µe −µ and the worst-case estimation doesn't work. Large channel loss seems to be the main barrier for long-distance QKD in practice.
In principle, there are 3 possible ways to resolve the issue. 1. Building up a transparent channel. 2. Using the real single-photon source. 3. Verifying the the upper bound of multiphoton counting rate more precisely. Obviously, the first method is almost impossible in near future or even mid-term future. The second method is possible in the next generation of practical QKD, but it is not likely to be really used in the near future. Moreover, it seems not to be the best choice from economic viewpoint. The third method seems to be the best choice, if we have such a method. For this purposes, some restricted results are given in ref. [13] .
There, a specific type of PNS attack is assumed and then Alice and Bob take action to verify that type of attack hasn't taken place. However, to conservative cryptographers, Eve can do everything that does not violate physics laws. Therefore detecting a specific type of PNS attack does not help the final verification of unconditional security. A very important method was then taken by Hwang [14] , where a method for unconditional verification the multiphoton counting rate (MPCR) is given. Using Hwang's result, one can faithfully estimate the upper bound of ∆ through decoy-pulses, given whatever type of PNS attack. The value of upper bound estimated there is much decreased than that in worst-case estimation.
However, Hwang's method does not produce the exact bound, though it is an unconditional verification. For example, in the case of µ = 0.3, by Hwang's method, the the optimized verified upper bound of MPCR is 60.4%, which is 2 times of the real value. With the value ∆ = 60.4%, the threshold of flipping rate should be less than 2%, by eq (2) . Also, the key rate must be low in practice. Latter, Lo and co-workers [15] proposed to test the counting rate of EVERY Poisson distribution of mixed states in Fock space, i.e., to test the counting rates of coherent states {|µ ′ e iθ } with ALL possible values of µ ′ in one protocol. In such a way the counting rates of each state |n n| can be calculated therefore an exact upper bound of ∆ can be given. However, this method seems to be inefficient in practice, because it requires infinite number of classes of different coherent states to work as the decoy states.
In this Letter, we shall give an alternative method to tighten the upper bound of ∆. In our protocol, besides that Alice sometimes blocks her signals, Everything else is just the same with Hwang ′ s protocol. The verified upper bound by our method is always less than that given by Hwang [14] . Our method is more efficient than the method given by Lo et [15] .
We only modify Hwang ′ s method a little bit while Lo ′ s method requires infinite number of classes of coherent states which seems to be an impossible task in any real set-up. Moreover, we have for the first time considered the real case where the number of pulses are finite and we have obtained good upper bounds for typical set-ups in practice. The verified upper bounds in such cases are only a few percent larger than the real values and the probability that the verified bound is violated is exponentially close to 0.
In our protocol, Alice needs 3 classes of states Y µ , Y 0 , Y µ ′ for the source.(They can be from one laser device): Class Y 0 only contains vacuum states. Class Y µ only contains coherent states |µe iθ , which will be used to carry the bit information and to distill the final key.
Class Y µ ′ contains coherent states |µ ′ e iθ only, which will be used as the decoy states. We always assume
in this paper. The central issue here is to verify the averaged counting rate of all those multi-photon pulses from class Y µ . Throughout this Letter, whenever we say the counting rate of any state ρ, we always mean the counting rate at Bob's side whenever a state ρ is sent out by Alice. We disregard what state Bob may receive here.
Alice randomizes the order of all pulses in the protocol. After transmitted all pulses to Bob, Alice announces which pulse belongs to which class and Bob calculate the counting rate of each class. At this stage, they have already known the counting rates of vacuum state, state |µe iθ and |µ ′ e iθ . Their task is to verify the counting rate of all those multi-photon pulses from class Y µ . We now show how to do so.
We start from the physical meaning of a coherent state with phase θ being totally random.
We have the following convex form:
and
And also, we always have the following convex form for the decoy state in class
(We shall only use the fact that d is non-negative and ρ d is a density operator.) In deriving the above convex form, we have used the fact P n (µ ′ )/P 2 (µ ′ ) > P n (µ)/P 2 (µ) for all n > 2, given the conditions of eq.(3).
With these convex forms of density operators, it is equivalent to say that Alice sometimes sends nothing (|0 0|), sometimes sends |1 1|, sometimes sends ρ c and sometimes sends ρ d , though Alice does not know which time she has sent out which one of these states. In each individual sending, She only knows which class the sent state belongs to. We shall
respectively. Our goal is simply to find a formula relating ∆ with the quantities of s 0 , S µ , S µ ′ which are known to Alice and Bob already after checking the click rates of each classes of
and s k is the counting rate of state Fock |k k|. Straightly, one can try to first verify values of all {s k , k ≥ 2} and then calculate s c by the above formula. This is the main idea used by Lo et al [15] and this is the reason why they have to use ALL possible µ ′ for the verification.
However, here we shall treat the issue more sophisticatedly. Instead of verifying each s k , we shall only verifying s c . That is to say, in our framework, there is only one unknown variable that is related to all multi-photon counts.
We shall first consider the asymptotic case and use only one notation for the counting rate of state ρ, no matter which class it belongs to. And latter, we shall consider the practical case where the counting rate for the same state ρ from different classes can be slightly different.
The detection efficiency in practice is not perfect. It ranges from 10% to 70%, mainly dependent on the wavelength of light. In general, given the input of one photon, it is assumed to be a probabilistic result for clicking or not. However, we are not sure whether the result is in principle random. It could be the case that the clicking result is determined by certain hidden variables which are unknown to us but known to Eve. Here we shall use the safest assumption that Eve also controls the the detection efficiency and dark counting of Bob's detector. We simply put the detection efficiency to the channel transmittance and assume perfect efficiency for Bob's detector. We also put the transmittance of Bob's optical devices to the channel. The term channel transmittance here is the overall transmittance including Channel, Bob's derives and detection efficiency. The counting rate s 0 contains the dark counting and ambient light counting. Both of them can be caused by Eve, in our assumption. Further, the detector does not distinguish one-photon pulse or multi-photon pulse.
To verify the upper bound of ∆, we only need to estimate the counting rate of s c . The simplest way one may imagine is to let Alice sends Bob some states ρ c and count the clicking rate. Unfortunately, so far it is unknown on how to prepare state ρ c . Our task here is to set up an equation between s c and {s 0 , S µ , S µ }. Note that s 0 , S µ , S µ are measured directly by the protocol itself. The coherent state ρ µ ′ is convexed by ρ c and other states. Since µ ′ > µ, the probability of ρ c in state ρ µ ′ is larger than that in ρ µ . Therefore we can make a preliminary estimation of s c From eq.(6) we immediately obtain
s 0 is known, s 1 and s d are unknown, but they can never be less than 0. Therefore we have
This is just the main result given by Hwang [14] . Note that we shall only use state ρ µ for key distillation. Explicitly, consider eq.(4), we obtain
Combining the above two equations we have
This is just eq.(12) in ref. [14] . Moreover, this result is independent of the specific value of channel transmittance. In the normal case that there is no Eve's attack Alice and Bob will find
in there protocol therefore they they can verify the following fact
which is just eq.(13) of Hwang's work [14] . Moreover, since we want the verified upper bound of ∆ as less as possible, we choose the µ ′ which maximizes µ ′ e −µ ′ . This requires µ ′ = 1, for whatever µ. Therefore, ∆ ≤ 60.4% is the optimized result by Hwang's method, for the case µ = 0.3. Our derivation looks significantly simpler than that in ref. [14] .
Having obtained the crude results above, we now show that the verification can be done more sophisticatedly and one can even obtain exact value for ∆ in the asymptotic case. In the inequality (9) 
As we have mentioned already, s 0 and S µ are measured in the protocol itself and therefore known to Alice and Bob. With the crude upper bound for s c given by eq.(9,10), we have the non-trivial lower bound for s 1 .
The updated s 1 will in return further tighten the upper bound ∆ by eq.(8), and the tightened ∆ will again update s 1 by eq.(14) and so on. After many iterations, the final value for s c and s 1 are given by the simultaneous constraint of of eq.(14) and inequality
Therefore we have the refined upper bound:
Here we have used eq.(10). If we ignore the s 0 term in the right-hand-side, we find that our result reaches the the exact value in the normal case that there is no Eve., if we set µ ′ very close to µ. In such a case Alice and Bob must find S µ ′ /S µ = 1−e −ηµ ′ 1−e −ηµ = µ ′ /µ and η is the transmittance. After dropping the s 0 term in eq.(17), we have
This is just the exact expected value in the case of normal lossy channel. This shows that eq.(17) indeed gives the optimized result if the detection noise is ignored. The reason is rather intuitive: If we only use the constraint of inequality (9), we obtain Hwang's result and the over estimation are twofold. One is the worst-case assumption of s 1 = 0. But if we use the simultaneous constraint of eq. (14,16) , the over estimation due to s 1 is removed.
Also, there is another worst-case assumption, s d = 0. If µ ′ is very close to µ, the parameter d in eq.(6) is very small and the net contribution of state ρ d to the total counting rate is negligible. The reason that Lo ′ s method requires infinite classes of decoy states is also clear: they try to know the counting rate of each individual Fock states. To know all values of {s n }, one must have infinite number of inputs therefore the counting rate of coherent states with ALL possible µ ′ have to be measured there. In both methods given by Hwang [14] and this work, the verified upper bound is for the quantity s c , i.e., we have put all counts caused by the multi-photon states into one unknown variable. However, Lo method [15] has attributed the multi-photon counts into infinite number of unknown variables.
The results above are only for the asymptotic case. In practice we cannot set µ ′ too close to µ due to the possible statistical fluctuation. In practice, our goal is to tighten the upper bound of ∆ and the probability that the real value of ∆ breaks our tightened upper bound is exponentially close to 0. Lets go into some details of such a task.
The counting rate for ρ in class Y µ ′ now can be slightly different from the counting rate for the same state ρ from another class, Y µ , with non-negligible probability. We shall use the primed notation for the counting rate for any state in class Y µ ′ and the original notation for the counting rate for any state in class Y µ . Explicitly, eq. (14, 16) are now converted to
Setting
Consider the left hand side of this inequality. If µ ′ − µ is so small that it is close to the statistical fluctuation r c , r 1 , the factor [µ ′ −µ−(µ ′ r c +µr 1 )] could be quite close to 0 therefore the bound value for ∆ = cs c /S µ will be very large. The important question here is now whether there are reasonable values for µ ′ so that our method has significant advantage to the previous method [14] . The answer is yes.
Given N 1 + N 2 copies of state ρ, suppose the counting rate for N 1 randomly chosen states is s ρ and the counting rate for the remained states is s ′ ρ the probability that s ρ −s ′ ρ > δ ρ is less than exp − 1 4 δ ρ 2 N 0 /s ρ and N 0 = Min(N 1 , N 2 ). Now we consider the difference of counting rates for the same state from different classes, Y µ and Y µ ′ . To make a faithful estimation for exponentially sure, we require δ ρ 2 N 0 /s ρ = 100. This causes a relative fluctuation
The probability of violation is less than e −25 . To formulate the relative fluctuation r 1 , r c by s c and s 1 , we only need check the number of state ρ c the number of states |1 1| used in the protocol. That is, using eq.(21), we can replace r 1 , r c in eq.(19) by 10e µ/2 1 µs 1 N , 10e µ/2 1 µ 2 scN , respectively and N is the number of pulses in class Y µ . Since we assume the case where vacuum-counting rate is much less than the counting rate of state ρ µ , we omit the effect of fluctuation in vacuum counting, i.e., we set r 0 = 0. With these inputs, eq.(19) can now be solved numerically. In particular, we assume a system with repetition rate of 40M Hz, which is a typical set-up in practice [2] . And we assume that Alice and Bob do key distillation every 10 minutes. This means, they have 2.4 × 10 10 pulses. Half of these pulses will be used to carry the bit information, i.e., class Y µ , 0.8 × 10 10 of them are used as the decoy pulses (Y µ ′ ) and 0.4 × 10 10 of them are blocked to test the value s 0 . We consider two transmittances, η = 10 −3 and η = 10 −4 . The results are listed in the following table. From this table we can see that good values of µ ′ indeed exist and our verified upper bounds are only by a few percent larger than the real value. Given η = 10 −4 , we also find that our results are insensitive to s 0 if s 0 ≤ 5 × 10 −6 . Note this is the only non-asymptotic result among all existing works so far. From the table we see our non-asymptotic values are less than Hwang ′ s asymptotic values already. And, in practice, we can regard both class Y µ , Y µ ′ as decoy states and choose the best values of µ, µ ′ so as to minimize ∆, and use another class of coherent state |µ 0 , θ for the signal pulses to optimize the key rate. respectively. The vacuum-state counting rate is assumed to be 10 −6 here. We find that, in each cases, our result is larger than the real value µ by only a few percents. In the real set-up given by Gobby et al [16] , the channel loss is 0.21dB/km, the devices and detection loss is 4.5% and s 0 = 8.5 × 10 −7 . Give these parameters, we believe that our protocol can help to set up the secure key over a distance longer than 200km, with a key rate of O(η).
TABLES
In conclusion, we have proposed an efficient and rigorous method to tighten the upper bound of multi-photon counting rate. Our method is more rigorous than Hwang method and more efficient than Lo method. We believe that our method is the best choice among all existing methods for beating the PNS attack. The method is immediately useful for longer-distance QKD or higher efficient QKD or both, in either free space or optical fiber.
It could be also rather useful in the global secure communication through satellite-reflection in the near future. Given our proposal, the techniques for efficient filtering and reducing the dark count become the most important issues for QKD over arbitrarily long distance.
Improving the repetition rate of the system can further tighten the bound, since it reduces the statistical fluctuation.
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